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Pittsburgh's Explosive Mystery: A New Holistic Study of the Allegheny Arsenal
Tragedy
Abstract
This research critically examines the issues surrounding the worst civilian disaster of the American Civil
War, occurring on September 17, 1862 in the Lawrenceville neighborhood of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
Here, seventy-eight teenage girls perished as the Allegheny Arsenal munitions laboratory exploded.
Investigations in the disaster’s aftermath, and more recent analysis, have remained largely hesitant in
placing chief blame as to its cause. Furthermore, for an event that would seem so significant, its story has
inadequately been told. Given that the national spotlight was elsewhere at the time, as the Battle of
Antietam was fought on the same day, existing literature has tended to focus almost exclusively on the
events unfolding on the battlefield. However, a careful consideration presents the necessary prelude to
the arsenal explosions, eyewitness testimony, and the aftermath, to ultimately consider what might have
caused the disaster, who should be blamed, and critical background that has been previously overlooked.
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PITTSBURGH’S EXPLOSIVE MYSTERY:
A NEW HOLISTIC STUDY OF THE
ALLEGHENY ARSENAL TRAGEDY
Ethan J. Wagner | Mercyhurst University
On September 18, 1862, the Pittsburgh Daily Post reported
on what it dubbed “the most terrible calamity which has ever
befallen our city” just one day prior. 1 Yet the denizens of
Pittsburgh’s Lawrenceville neighborhood were not the only
ones faced with tragedy. For most of the country, what
transpired on the banks of the Allegheny River paled in
comparison with what was taking place to the south. On the
deadliest single day in American history, the Battle of
Antietam became a crucial juncture in the Civil War—it was
the Union victory that prompted Abraham Lincoln to issue
the Emancipation Proclamation—and was bound to capture
most headlines. As the nation was bombarded with stories
from the battlefield, other occurrences on that day have
either lacked sufficient coverage or remained neglected in
mainstream Civil War discourse.
In her recent book Gunpowder Girls: The True
Stories of Three Civil War Tragedies, Tanya Anderson has
The author would like to thank Dr. Benjamin Scharff for his guidance in
bringing this project to life, as well as Dr. John Olszowka for his
assistance during the editing process. Additionally, special thanks go out
to Mr. James Wudarczyk and Mr. Tom Powers of the Lawrenceville
Historical Society for their hospitality and willingness to provide
resources during the early stages of this research.
1

“A Direful Calamity,” Daily Post (Pittsburgh), September 18, 1862.
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lamented that September 17, 1862 was the deadliest day of
the Civil War on two fronts. The first, Antietam, has been
widely documented. But the little-known explosions at
Lawrenceville’s Allegheny Arsenal, which resulted in the
tragic death of seventy-eight young workers, deserves a
more proper study. As the worst civilian disaster of the war,
its neglect in the national memory proves both surprising and
regretful. 2 The scenes of horror outlined in local newspapers
the next day described three consecutive explosions around
2 p.m., ripping apart the federal munitions laboratories and
killing dozens of female laborers. Onlookers were only left
with the sight of charred building remains and burning
corpses, understandably suggesting “an appalling sight.” 3
The sparse literature that does exist on the Allegheny
Arsenal has only considered the historical record from the
day of the explosions onward. As a matter of course, it has
neglected to examine how prior events leading up to the
blasts might have shaped the day’s events, which historian
Arthur B. Fox has described as among “the most renowned
in Pittsburgh history.” 4 Thus, the present study aims at a
more holistic examination of the circumstances leading up
to the explosions and how they might explain why this
tragedy occurred—as well as who should be held
responsible.
2
Tanya Anderson, Gunpowder Girls: The True Stories of Three Civil
War Tragedies (Kansas City, MO: Quindara Press, 2016), 44.
3
“Appalling Disaster,” Daily Pittsburgh Gazette and Commercial
Journal, September 18, 1862.
4
Arthur B. Fox, Pittsburgh During the American Civil War, 1860-1865
(Chicora, PA: Mechling Bookbindery, 2002), 118.
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Contemporary scholarship suggests that the arsenal
disaster can most likely be attributed to a combination of
negligence and misfortune, although the precise nature of its
causation remains controversial. Narratives have also tended
to dismiss the possibility of intentional wrongdoing. A broad
approach to the story must consider historical realities that
others have failed to properly examine, such as the
established record of Confederate sabotage throughout the
Civil War, local political tensions and Copperhead activity,
and Pittsburgh’s strategic significance. Ultimately, these
considerations reveal that, while intentional wrongdoing was
at least possible, the evidence suggests that the Allegheny
Arsenal disaster can chiefly be attributed to the negligence
of the DuPont Company, rather than that of arsenal
commander John Symington and his associates.
Background on Allegheny Arsenal
Existing research on the explosions has centered around the
two major investigations undertaken in their aftermath. Two
days after the disaster, the city coroner gathered a panel of
locals to collect eyewitness testimony. 5 All agreed that the
blasts likely originated from the roadway outside the
laboratories, as barrels of gunpowder were constantly being
delivered into the buildings for use in munitions production.
Most of those interviewed stated that rules were clearly
Tom Powers and James Wudarczyk, interview by the author,
Lawrenceville, PA, June 5, 2020. Ironically, the original transcripts of
this investigation were destroyed in a fire at the country courthouse in
1882, leaving the reports from the Daily Post as the only surviving
accounts of the proceedings.

5
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posted, including directives that spilled gunpowder was
always to be collected and disposed of. Witness Joseph
Frick, who was delivering these barrels at the time, testified
that it was customary to unload and distribute powder on the
porch, allowing piles of excess to accumulate on the
roadways outside in the days prior to the explosions. In
addition, the compelling story of worker Rachel Dunlap,
who reported seeing a blaze appear underneath Frick’s
delivery wagon just prior to the initial blast, corroborated the
likely epicenter of the incident. 6
Consensus began to fragment when others refuted
these claims, arguing that they never saw powder spilled
outside. Meanwhile, civilian arsenal superintendent
Alexander McBride assured the jury that he swiftly
reprimanded those who did not comply with the directive to
not sweep loose powder onto the roadway, as he even hired
workers whose sole job was to ensure that this did not
happen. Rather, McBride stressed that he reported to his
superiors on numerous occasions his concern regarding the
DuPont Company supplying gunpowder in defective leaking
barrels with routinely ill-fitting lids. 7
The coroner’s investigation settled on the theory that
the blasts began on the roadway, as loose powder somehow
accumulated and sparked fire. However, questions remained
concerning the nature of the road itself. Frick further testified
that he remarked to himself on several occasions how
“The Arsenal Catastrophe — Coroner’s Investigation,” Daily Post
(Pittsburgh), September 20, 1862.
7
“The Arsenal Catastrophe.”
6
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uneven the road was and how one day an accident would
surely result from shaken gunpowder. A Mr. K. Bracken
substantiated this testimony, as he swore to have laid the
stone for the road, which contained a mixture of freestone
and was therefore highly susceptible to sparking if struck
correctly by the iron of a wheel or horse’s shoe. 8 This
seemed to carry great validity, as stone quarry expert
William Baxter related how “the stone on the roadway at the
arsenal grounds was as dangerous for striking fire as any I
know.” 9
The jury panel concluded twelve days after the
tragedy, where the majority opinion ruled that the explosion
was caused by arsenal commander Col. John Symington,
superintendent Alexander McBride, and other top
associates, whose neglect resulted in unsafe conditions. Of
arguably greater significance was the fact that this decision
was not unanimous, as two jurors dissented, preferring to
clear Symington and instead blame the incident solely on the
negligence of McBride and other arsenal higher-ups. Both
verdicts failed to officially implicate the DuPont Company
for any direct, punishable involvement. 10
Dissatisfied with the findings that blamed him, Col.
Symington called for his own military investigation to be
conducted by the Ordinance Department. He played a
critical role in this inquiry, correcting the missteps
“The Arsenal Disaster — Continuation of the Coroner’s Investigation,”
Daily Post (Pittsburgh), September 23, 1862.
9
“The Arsenal Disaster.”
10
“The Coroner’s Jury on the Arsenal Catastrophe: The Verdict — Two
Jurors Dissent,” Daily Post (Pittsburgh), September 29, 1862.
8
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committed in the coroner’s investigation where crossexamination was inexplicably neglected in favor of witness
depositions. 11 However, determining a definitive answer
proved difficult, as key eyewitnesses changed their stories or
were not invited to attend. For instance, Frick complained of
having been asked so many questions that he could no longer
think straight, and Rachel Dunlap’s story went unheard, as
women were precluded from participating in military affairs
at that time. 12 Furthermore, Symington only summoned
witnesses who he could either discredit or were favorable to
his cause. 13
Ultimately, the military tribunal looked more favorably on Symington. Those assembled made several
commendatory statements concerning his conduct, relaying
how he “took every care and precaution… to guard against
accidents of every kind.” 14 As a result, he was surely pleased
with the ruling that he had no reasonable basis on which to
be blamed. That said, he also had reason for dissatisfaction
with the caveat to that same opinion, as the tribunal
concluded by suggesting that “the cause of the explosion

Tod Abele, “Allegheny Arsenal Explosion,” Battlefield Pennsylvania,
DVD, hosted by Brady Crytzer (Camp Hill, PA: Pennsylvania Cable
Network, 2017).
12
Transcript of the Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry to Investigate an
Explosion at the Allegheny Arsenal Lab on September 17, 1862,
Convened on October 15, 1862 under Order 288 of the Adjutants
General Office, Record Group 153, Court Martial Records, National
Archives, Mid-Atlantic Region, Philadelphia, 50.
13
James Wudarczyk, Until the Morning Cometh: Civil War Era
Pittsburgh (Apollo, PA: Closson Press, 3012), 130.
14
Transcript, 101-02.
11
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could not be satisfactorily ascertained.” 15 While the need to
get Allegheny Arsenal back up and running surely played
into why the case was closed so quickly, Symington likely
remained bitter.
Primarily referencing these two investigations, the
present debate has leaned toward the idea that the military
inquiry’s findings appear valid. The most readily accepted
theory remains that some source of iron sparked the road,
igniting accumulated piles of gunpowder and causing a
series of explosions. The resultant belief has maintained that
negligence on the parts of Symington, McBride, other
officials, and the DuPont Company all played a relatively
equal role in an accidental tragedy. 16 Yet this consensus has
largely looked past significant components of the story,
which challenge the idea that sabotage could not possibly be
in play or that DuPont should not be more aggressively
examined.
Confederates and Copperheads
An established record of Confederate sabotage throughout
the war places it within reason to consider that something
more sinister might have been to blame at Allegheny
Arsenal. The South’s agrarian society and paucity of
manufacturing centers forced the Confederacy to resort to
more unorthodox methods to gain some leverage against its
industrial disadvantage. This came in the form of
Transcript, 101-02.
Tom Powers and James Wudarczyk, “Behind the Scenes of the
Allegheny Arsenal Explosion,” Pennsylvania Legacies 13, no. 1/2
(2013): 45.
15
16
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government-financed subversion. 17 The Confederacy was so
committed to this strategy that President Jefferson Davis
approved the establishment of an official “Band of Deconstructionists” by 1863, solely dedicated to undermining the
Union war effort. 18 If sabotage was undertaken prior to the
Confederate president himself signing off a new force to
carry out attacks, such an outcome at Allegheny Arsenal
would have been ideal.
The Central Intelligence Agency’s 2017 report on
intelligence during the Civil War documents a secret session
of the Confederate Congress held in February 1864. At this
meeting, a bill was passed to finance and reward acts of
sabotage against the Union carried out by Southern
sympathizers who had gained asylum in Canada. Moreover,
these agents’ activities stretched as far south as New York,
Ohio, and various cities in proximity to Pittsburgh,
suggesting that more local sabotage could have occurred. 19
Evidence suggests that sabotage efforts were not merely
carried out by rogue radicals. Rather, there was a systemic,
premeditated plan at the highest levels of the Confederate
government, making it reasonable to question whether the
only saboteurs in the North were those unlucky enough to be
caught.
Mark K. Ragan, Confederate Saboteurs: Building the Hunley and
Other Secret Weapons of the Civil War (College Station, TX: Texas
A&M University Press, 2015), 1.
18
Ragan, Confederate Saboteurs, 134.
19
Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence in the Civil War, drafted and
prepared by Thomas Allen (Washington, D.C.: Office of Public Affairs,
2017), 43.
17
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Other well-known incidents of Confederate subversion included those in Missouri, as the prevalence of the
so-called “boat-burners” made St. Louis a hotbed of activity.
By 1864, the Union had commissioned personnel to combat
subversion and track down suspected spies. 20 Federal
discoveries of such acts eventually became more routine
with Provost Marshal James H. Baker’s sleuthing in St.
Louis. He reported in multiple letters to Assistant Secretary
of War Charles Anderson Dana how an extensive list had
been compiled of men known to be employed by the
Confederacy to “destroy government property and
steamboats” on the Mississippi, leading Dana to promise
“immediate attention to the matter.” 21 Similarly, concern of
widespread sabotage was recognized elsewhere, as several
other Union officials, such as Major and acting Judge
Advocate General A. A. Hosmer, reviewed the list of names
and further added how “the subject is regarded as one of
great importance.” 22
From the nineteen known saboteurs detained in St.
Louis alone, it was determined that over seventy steamboats
had been destroyed by Confederate-allied or sympathetic
agents, many of whom were sent at the behest of Jefferson
Davis. Edward Frazor’s confession to having met with Davis
and Confederate Secretary of War James Seddon in
Richmond demonstrates the length to which such acts would
receive government support. According to Frazor, Davis
CIA, Intelligence in the Civil War, 17-18.
“Sabotage of the Sultana: Provost Marshal J. H. Baker’s Report on the
Boat-Burners,” The Boat-Burners, Civil War St. Louis, 2001.
22
“Sabotage of the Sultana.”
20
21
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personally offered him a sum of $400,000 to oversee
sabotage efforts throughout the North. 23 The prospect of
government-backed financial incentive had already been
established, but the fact that Davis further urged saboteurs to
cause as much damage as possible makes it likely that
pockets of activity could spring up anywhere, at any time.
Eventually, rebels such as Joseph W. Tucker began
receiving money from the Confederate government based on
the price of the damages inflicted. A confidential letter
between Tucker and Davis outlined the state’s desire for
more direct attacks on Union infrastructure, specifically
armies, arsenals, and depots of stores as a means of
“paralyzing the military strength of the federal government.” 24 While this letter was not written until March 1864,
Pittsburgh contained every type of Union infrastructure that
Davis outlined as preferred targets.
In addition to examining Confederate sabotage with
respect to intentional wrongdoing at Allegheny Arsenal,
there also existed rampant political discord and violence in
the Pittsburgh area. Allegheny County and neighboring
Washington County were teeming with tensions prior to and
throughout the war. Political polarization was especially
visible in downtown Pittsburgh, beginning with Abraham
Lincoln’s initial bid for the presidency in 1860. Lincoln’s
campaign was a harbinger of war and greatly divided people
in their opinions on the Union more broadly. Local
“Sabotage of the Sultana.”
“Joseph W. Tucker and the Boat-Burners,” The Boat-Burners, Civil
War St. Louis, 2001.
23
24
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Presbyterian minister Richard Lea said as much in a sermon
following the arsenal explosions, recalling his conversation
with congregant Agnes Davidson, who made a political
pledge to “no longer be a secessionist from the government
of God.” 25 The creation of an “us versus them” mentality
suggests that the demonization of the Confederacy, at least
among some Pittsburghers, was powerful.
City newspapers further catered to a split political
base. While Allegheny County generally leaned Republican,
citizens could expect to read entirely different accounts of
presidential politics depending on their chosen source. The
Daily Gazette strongly backed Lincoln, while the Pittsburgh
Post advocated for Democrats and states’ rights. 26 Best
evidenced in the coverage of Lincoln’s stop through the city
en route to his inauguration in 1861, both the Gazette and the
Post agreeably reported on how the Federal Street train
station was crowded in anticipation of the president-elect’s
arrival. However, the Post relayed that the onset of rain had
left the platform deserted, while the Gazette apparently saw
thousands who eagerly remained. Allegheny County, which
Lincoln proclaimed the “banner county of the state, if not of
the whole Union” in his attempt to win over Southern
sympathizers, clearly was not marked by partisan unity. 27

25
Richard Lea, Sermon Commemorative of the Great Explosion at the
Allegheny Arsenal: At Lawrenceville, Pennsylvania on September 17,
1862 (Pittsburgh: W. S. Haven, 1862), 6.
26
Len Barcousky, Civil War Pittsburgh: Forge of the Union (Charleston,
SC: History Press, 2013), 11.
27
Barcousky, Civil War Pittsburgh, 15-17.
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Copperheads, or Northern Democrats who opposed
the Civil War, later arose in and around Pittsburgh stemming
from Lincoln’s stance on slavery, conscription, and states’
rights policies. Local Republicans accused Democrats of
disloyalty and treason; as a result, violence spread into
neighboring Washington County. 28 Pittsburgh journalist Len
Barcousky explains that the borough of Burgettstown in
Washington County was a “nest” of such activity by 1863.
While the region became a hotbed of Southern-sympathizing
Copperheads, the true nature of that sympathy was often less
“secessionist” and more in favor of a negotiated end to the
war and the preservation of slavery. 29 Though Barcousky
only describes what was occurring in 1863, the presence of
similar beliefs can be presumed just one year earlier,
especially given the public anti-Lincoln sentiment among
many in Allegheny County.
Washington County Copperheads were not all
motivated by the singular desire for treason and bloodshed.
Rather, many were simply resolute in their perceived need
to defend traditional republican values, social order, the
Constitution, and the Union. 30 These people of the rural
North were so used to having agency over their daily lives
that they could not fathom the idea of being told by the
government to take up arms and fight alongside Black men
Fox, Pittsburgh During the American Civil War, 201.
Barcousky, “Eyewitness 1863: Civil War draft debate heats up
Washington Co.,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (September 15, 2013).
30
Eric D. Duchess, “Between Frontier and Factory: Growth and
Development in Washington, Pennsylvania, 1810-1870” (Ph.D. diss.,
West Virginia University, 2012), 315.
28
29
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for a cause which had little effect on them, if at all. The
thought of giving in to such requests from the federal
government presented the equally appalling prospects of a
more structured system of authority which would surely
attempt to ruin their lives. 31 For the citizens of Washington
County and in other areas throughout the North, conscription
violated what they believed to be a cornerstone of the
American republic: volunteerism over coercion. 32
Copperhead ideological motivation aside, there also
appeared legitimate reason to believe that significant
violence might erupt. As the Daily Pittsburgh Gazette and
Commercial Journal reported, such “excitement” did occur
in Washington County on at least one known occasion. In an
article from August 1863, witnesses recounted a “war like
demonstration” in Burgettstown. Copperhead demonstrators
lashed out at Union cavalry units passing through, to the
point that some sort of “difficulty” occurred, as pistol shots
rang out and peace had to be restored. The article also cited
the demonstrators’ disdain for all things Union, relaying how
“it was evident that the presence of the United States uniform
and flag was distasteful to them,” and how protestors were
seen adorned in Copperhead and Butternut breast pins. 33
Robert M. Sandow, Deserter Country: Civil War Opposition in the
Pennsylvania Appalachian (New York: Fordham University Press,
2009), 59.
32
Sandow, Deserter Country, 75; Jennifer L. Weber, Copperheads: The
Rise and Fall of Lincoln’s Opponents in the North (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2006), 101.
33
“Excitement in Washington County: Skirmish with Copperheads —
Hot at Burgettstown — Arrests, etc.,” Daily Pittsburgh Gazette and
Commercial Journal, August 10, 1863.
31
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Motive for the attack surely had to extend beyond the
cursory concept of wanting to derail the Union war effort.
There were numerous cities of great strategic and symbolic
importance to the North during the war, such as New York,
Boston, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C. Yet Pittsburgh
was also critical. From the start, the rapid secession of states
just south of Pennsylvania took Northerners by surprise, and
they were quicky overtaken by paranoia. This appeared
particularly true in Pittsburgh, as city officials recognized
the potential for outside threat, and the local Committee of
Public Safety issued a rallying cry in 1861 to “keep a sharp
lookout for traitors.” 34 Considering that Pittsburgh was not
much farther from the border than Sharpsburg, Maryland,
locals had to wonder if their city was next to witness a major
battle, especially with a federal arsenal in operation
nearby. 35
This concern was heightened by the perception that
government officials shared equal concern over the city’s
importance and vulnerability. The War Department went on
to record that its intelligence suggested Pittsburgh might be
a logical target, calling it a “vital Union point.” 36
Meanwhile, reporters fueled the hysteria by construing a
story of how the city was “in imminent danger of rebel
Robert C. Plumb and George Pressly McClelland, Your Brother in
Arms: A Union Soldier’s Odyssey (Columbia, MO: University of
Missouri Press, 2011), 2.
35
“Allegheny Arsenal Explosion and the Creation of Public Memory,”
National Archives at Philadelphia, National Archives, August 15, 2016.
36
George Swetnam, “Thirty Days of Panic,” Western Pennsylvania
Historical Magazine 51, no. 4 (1968): 334.
34
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attack.” 37 In fact, the city remained in a constant state of
vulnerability, as the War Department found itself
preoccupied trying to calm the fears of attack in Washington
while simultaneously trying to supply the front lines with
sufficient forces to sustain the fight. In consequence,
Pittsburgh had only a thin staff of professional soldiers.
Considering Pittsburghers had been so instrumental in
creating the munitions at Allegheny Arsenal used to kill
those supposedly coming for revenge, many believed that
their involvement made them more pronounced targets. 38
Such paranoia and defensive actions were justified,
as Pittsburgh’s manufacturing proved instrumental in
sustaining the Union war effort. None of its industries were
more critical than Allegheny Arsenal, which singlehandedly
produced or contributed around ten percent of all cartridges
used by Union forces in the Western Theater. 39 However, the
most important statistic in considering Pittsburgh as a
possible Confederate target was the Fort Pitt Foundry’s
production, in coordination with Allegheny Arsenal, of sixty
percent of the heavily artillery used by Union forces. 40 It
stands to reason that a good site for any Confederate advance
into the Union should be in the place where such a high
volume of material was being furnished and a strong
Copperhead base already resided.

Swetnam, “Thirty Days of Panic,” 334.
Judith Giesberg, “Explosion at the Allegheny Arsenal,” HistoryNet,
March 31, 2016.
39
Fox, Pittsburgh During the American Civil War, 109.
40
Fox, Pittsburgh During the American Civil War, 135; 211.
37
38
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Pittsburgh would have also been an attractive target
for Southern attack because of its strategically significant
physical geography. The city’s proximity to the pivotal
border states made it an easy target to conceivably access.
Not far from the Mason-Dixon line, this region had its share
of both pro- and anti-Lincoln sentiment. With the South in
ruins and well-stocked Pennsylvania farms and factories
nearby, it seemed only logical that Pittsburgh might be
targeted. 41 Since the Confederacy would have been eager to
entertain the prospect of pillaging these Northern resources,
Pittsburgh could truly have been called a critical “border
city.”
Additionally, Pittsburgh’s geographic features made
it crucial junction for Union supply lines at the midpoint
between east and west, where advantages in place, labor,
capital, and manufacturing coalesced to produce something
extraordinary. As Samuel Durant asserted in his History of
Allegheny Co., Pennsylvania from 1876, Pittsburgh served
as a natural gateway, not only via its three rivers, but also
because nearly all major railways had to converge at its
terminals. Truly, as Durant said of this city, “a thorough and
systematic development of all its resources, natural and
acquired, cannot fail to make this point permanently one of
the greatest manufacturing and commercial inland centers in
America.” 42 Considering that Allegheny was one of the
Union’s premier arsenals, the city’s ability to mediate a twoBarcousky, Civil War Pittsburgh, 10-11.
Samuel Durant, History of Allegheny Co., Pennsylvania (Philadelphia:
L. H. Everts & Co., 1876), 101; George H. Thurston, Allegheny County’s
Hundred Years (Pittsburgh: A. A. Anderson & Son, 1888).
41
42
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front war effort made it worthwhile for the Confederacy to
consider targeting. 43
Colonel John Symington
Given the record of Confederate sabotage along with the
city’s significance, Pittsburghers had reason to suspect
something deliberate behind the Allegheny Arsenal
explosion. They had even more reason to pin commander
Col. John Symington as a likely suspect. Locals knew of his
familial connections to the South, with his wife hailing from
the slaveholding border state of Maryland, his son joining
the Confederate Army, and his daughter marrying
Confederate General William Boggs and sporting a Southern
rosette to Sunday church services. However, residents did
not know that he had previously signed a letter of
recommendation to help one of his wife’s relatives gain
admission to West Point—a relative who happened to be
named George Pickett and later led one of the most infamous
Confederate charges of the entire Civil War at Gettysburg. 44
Ultimately, Symington’s record, and that of his
closest associates, must speak for itself. From the time he
first arrived at Allegheny Arsenal in 1857, he never
embodied the persona of a radical, treasonous mastermind.
Rather, his appointment was more intended to be a laid-back
Edward M. McKeever, “Earlier Lawrenceville,” Western
Pennsylvania Historical Magazine 5, no. 4 (1922): 280-82.
44
James Wudarczyk, “Explosion at the Allegheny Arsenal Rocks
Pittsburgh,” History Net, November 20, 2018; “Census Record —
Symington and Boggs Family,” original from 1860 US census,
population schedule, NARA microfilm publication M653 (Washington,
D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, n.d.).
43
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retirement position where he, at the age of sixty-five, could
serve out his final assignment to cap off an otherwise
pristine, forty-plus year record of military service. This was
especially significant considering he had already held prior
appointments at federal arsenals in Washington, D.C., St.
Louis, and Harpers Ferry. 45 While Pittsburgh offered an
appealing target, if Symington wanted to carry out a major
act of sabotage, it would have made far more sense to launch
an attack during his appointment in the even higher-profile
capital.
Symington lost the trust of many Pittsburghers
before the war even began, as his involvement in what came
to be known as the “gun incident” fueled an initial wave of
rumors. Following orders issued at the behest of Secretary of
War John B. Floyd in 1860, Symington worked to oversee
the shipment of vast stores of artillery from Allegheny to
other forts throughout the South. Pittsburghers were right to
be outraged by this blatant attempt of Floyd’s, the former
governor of Virginia and a Southern sympathizer, to allocate
resources to his Southern friends on the eve of a looming
war. Yet they were entirely incorrect in scapegoating
Symington for nearly allowing this to happen. 46 While
history has generally not been kind to the “just following
orders” excuse, it does seem justified in this instance.
Symington can further be ruled out as an intentional
saboteur due to his record of taking swift action against any
Todd Abele, “Allegheny Arsenal Explosion.”
Fox, Pittsburgh During the American Civil War, 13, 104; Barcousky,
Civil War Pittsburgh, 25.
45
46
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dangerous activity at Allegheny Arsenal. Just under a year
prior to the disaster, he wrote to his superior in Washington,
General James W. Ripley, explaining his decision to fire
much of the arsenal staff. As Symington reported, matches
were discovered near packed munitions that were awaiting
shipment. After what he called the “strictest investigation,”
an inability to locate a single culprit required that he dismiss
the area’s teenage male workforce, and he resolved from
then on to hire only girls. 47 As researcher John Carnprobst
suggests, boys were often more interested in playing with
weapons of war than in making them. 48 It stands to reason
that had Symington been sympathetic to the Confederacy, it
would have made far more sense to keep the unproductive
and dangerous boys on staff to either coincidentally cause an
explosion or otherwise impede production.
Symington’s testimony and actions both before and
after the disaster, as well as the vote of confidence from
those closest to him, definitively rules out his intentional
involvement. Less than two months prior to the explosions,
he made his intentions clear that he wanted nothing more
than to retire from active duty. In a letter to War Department
higher-up General Edward D. Townsend, Symington
formally submitted a request to step away from supervision
John Symington, “Letter from Colonel John Symington to General
James W. Ripley,” Allegheny Arsenal Records, National Archives and
Records Administration, Mid-Atlantic, Philadelphia, October 2, 1861;
quoted in Powers and Wudarczyk, “Behind the Scenes of the Allegheny
Arsenal Explosion.”
48
John L Carnprobst,” Tragedy at the U.S. Allegheny Arsenal,” Blue &
Gray Magazine, 1985, 29.
47
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at Allegheny Arsenal. 49 The fact that this request was denied
by senior military officials speaks both to his trustworthiness
and that his decades-long record of professionalism made it
unthinkable that he could have had anything to do with what
later transpired.
Under oath at the coroner’s investigation, multiple
witnesses confirmed that Symington played the role of hero
at the time of the blasts, coordinating rescue efforts and
consoling victims. 50 Even arsenal superintendent Alexander
McBride, whose own daughter Kate perished in the disaster,
personally vouched that Symington never did anything to
jeopardize lives or equipment at the arsenal and took every
reasonable precaution to avoid accident. 51 This plays an
important role in Symington’s defense, as McBride—a
civilian who had nothing to lose by pointing the finger and
every reason to be angry with Symington, whose leadership
potentially resulted in the death of his daughter—declined to
offer condemnation. Moreover, Symington was the one with
everything to lose by calling for the military investigation,
as a negative result promised to destroy his career.
Prior to the explosions, McBride repeatedly
complained about the DuPont Company’s practice of
reusing wooden delivery barrels and storing dry powder in
warm conditions. This practice, McBride explained, caused
Edward D. Townsend, “Edward D. Townsend to Colonel James
Symington, August 23, 1862,” Letters Received at the Allegheny
Arsenal, Records of the Chief of Ordinance, RG 156, National Archives
and Records Administration, Mid-Atlantic Region, Philadelphia.
50
“The Arsenal Catastrophe — Coroner’s Investigation,” Daily Post
(Pittsburgh), September 20, 1862.
51
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expansion and cracks in the barrels, and allowed powder to
easily sift through and fall to the ground. 52 This concern was
only heightened by the stone road’s susceptibility to
sparking against the constant force of iron-hoofed delivery
horses, which was established in the early stages of both
investigations. 53 Symington testified to never having been
told of powder being furnished in such defective barrels and
remarked how the containers had only ever been returned to
DuPont at the company’s request. 54 Furthermore, one must
also wonder what Union military inquirer would possibly
want to anger DuPont, given the company’s importance to
the nation’s infrastructure. As the largest gunpowder
manufacturer for the Northern war effort, any interruption to
the supply chain due to prolonged safety investigations
would have risked serious setbacks on the battlefield. 55
DuPont looks even worse when one considers that
the same type of disaster was not exclusive to Allegheny
Arsenal. DuPont-supplied munitions laboratories suffered
no less than eleven explosions throughout the war, resulting
in more than one hundred deaths. 56 While none were nearly
as deadly as that which occurred at Allegheny, problems
Anderson, Gunpowder Girls, 53-54.
Marylynne Pitz, “Allegheny Arsenal Explosion: Pittsburgh’s Worst
Day During the Civil War,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, September 12,
2012.
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were rampant across the country. In each of these separate
cases, the prevalence of worker complains regarding foolish
safety practices and the disastrous aftermath shows that what
occurred in Lawrenceville also happened elsewhere to
varying degrees. While most of these explosions were later
determined to be the result of worker negligence, the
consequences of lax safety oversight should have made
DuPont realize the dangers of cutting corners with recycled
barrels and ill-fitting lids at Allegheny Arsenal.
The notion of intentional malice at Allegheny
Arsenal as early as 1862 is also questionable. The first
documented evidence of Confederate sabotage comes from
early 1863, perhaps suggesting that the war’s escalation
drove the South to greater desperation and took to
government-sanctioned subversion only after the arsenal
exploded. Moreover, the fact that Copperhead frustration in
Washington County was primarily over forced conscription
and the specter of having to fight alongside Black men likely
only became a violence-provoking issue after the
Emancipation Proclamation and Conscription Act in 1863.
Lincoln’s decision to shift the war from a push for
reunification to a crusade for abolition only further damaged
his relationship with the formerly moderate Copperheads. 57
While factors at play outside of Pittsburgh and the
possibility of intentional wrongdoing require a more
thorough examination, the historical record shows that the
DuPont Company deserves the principal blame for the
tragedy at Allegheny Arsenal. Symington ended up a victim
57
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of this tragedy himself. For a man who graduated near the
top of his class at West Point in 1815, enjoyed a long military
career, and did not have disaster visit him in his mid-sixties,
the only crime committed was by the investigators who
tarnished his legacy and left him to retire in disgrace. 58
Symington was subsequently relieved of his command, went
on leave of absence for about a year, was briefly reassigned
to a Washington shipyard, then retired. He spent the last few
months of his life distrusted and forgotten, dying in 1864. 59
The scenes of horror at Allegheny Arsenal presented
a lesson in the newfound nature of war. It showed that a strict
demarcation between battlefield and home front could no
longer exist, as the strife did not distinguish between male
combatants and innocent teenage girls. 60 The conflict
required that the military quickly put the tragedy to rest,
surreally symbolized by the disposal of the arsenal’s charred
remains in the Allegheny River and the rebuilding efforts
undertaken immediately after the explosions. The real shame
is that the women who died were patriots as much as their
male counterparts on the battlefield, but remain forgotten. 61
Unsurprisingly, few of the children who flock to the
playground at Arsenal Park today, or who attend Arsenal
Middle School next door, know of the events that transpired
around them.
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